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Enforcing Dividend
Withholding on Derivatives
By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
While the United States formally imposes a 30 percent
withholding tax on dividends paid to nonresident aliens,
the income statistics indicate that the tax is rarely paid.
The reason is that a nonresident investor can swap into
U.S. securities, receiving contract payments to match
both capital gain and dividends. Treasury had ruled that
swap payments have an origin in the taxpayer’s resi-
dence so there is no withholding obligation on payments
that match dividends. Later, Treasury determined that
substitute dividends under securities loans should be
treated as dividends, but this rule can be avoided by
combining securities loans and swaps. The proposal
would impose withholding on dividend equivalents on
the grounds that there is no policy justification for a
distinction between dividends, dividend substitutes, and
dividend equivalents paid under swaps.
A. Current Law
1. Introduction. The United States levies a 30 percent
withholding tax on fixed or determinable annual or
periodic (FDAP) income paid from U.S. sources to non-
resident taxpayers.1 This withholding tax has been in
place since the beginning of the income tax as a way of
ensuring that nonresident taxpayers fulfill their tax obli-
gation when earning U.S.-source income. Since the 1930s,
the withholding tax on the gross amount of FDAP has
been the final tax on such income, collected in lieu of the
graduated income tax on net income that is levied on U.S.
residents (and on nonresidents earning income that is
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business).
Several exemptions and treaty-based reductions apply
to most forms of FDAP. For example, portfolio interest
(interest paid to nonresidents who do not own 10 percent
or more of the stock of a corporate payer) is typically
exempt from withholding tax under the ‘‘portfolio inter-
est exemption.’’2 Royalties are likewise typically exempt
from withholding tax because most of them are paid to
countries with which we have treaties that follow the U.S.
and OECD models and reduce withholding on royalties
to zero.3
Thus, the main source of revenue from the withhold-
ing tax on FDAP is dividends. Dividends are subject to
the full 30 percent withholding if not paid to a resident of
a treaty jurisdiction, but even in the case of treaty
partners, our treaties only reduce dividend withholding
to 15 percent for portfolio dividends and 5 percent for
direct dividends.4 This represents a judgment of Treasury
and Congress that it is appropriate for nonresident
taxpayers to pay a withholding tax on dividends, even
though the underlying corporate income has already
been taxed once.5
1Sections 871(a)(1) and 881(a)(1).
2Sections 871(h) and 881(c).
3See Reuven Avi-Yonah and Martin B. Tittle, The Integrated
2006 United States Model Income Tax Treaty (Vandeplas, 2008), Art.
12.
4Id. at Art. 10. Many recent treaties (for example, that with
the United Kingdom) reduce the dividend rate to zero for some
direct dividends, but never for portfolio dividends.
5While it may seem strange that dividends, which are not
deductible, are subject to withholding tax while interest and
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The United States imposes a 30 percent withhold-
ing tax on dividends paid to nonresident aliens. How-
ever, this tax is rarely paid by portfolio investors
because they can swap into U.S. securities, receiving
payments to match both capital gain and dividends.
Treasury has ruled that swap payments have an origin
in the taxpayer’s residence so there is no withholding
obligation on payments that match dividends. The
proposal would impose withholding tax on dividend
equivalents on the ground that there is no policy
justification for a distinction between dividends, sub-
stitute dividends under securities lending transaction
(which are treated as dividends and are subject to
withholding), and dividend equivalents paid under
swaps.
The proposal is made as a part of the Shelf Project,
a collaboration of tax professionals to develop and
perfect proposals to strengthen the tax base. Shelf
Project proposals are intended to raise revenue with-
out raising rates — the best systems have the lowest
feasible tax rates because the taxes are unavoidable.
Shelf projects defend the tax base and improve the
rationality and efficiency of the tax system. Given the
current calls for tax stimulus, some shelf projects may
stay on the shelf for awhile. A longer description of the
Shelf Project can be found at ‘‘The Shelf Project:
Revenue-Raising Projects That Defend the Tax Base,’’
Tax Notes, Dec. 10, 2007, p. 1077, Doc 2007-22632, 2007
TNT 238-37. Shelf Project proposals follow the format
of a congressional tax committee report in explaining
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But do dividends actually bear a withholding tax of 30
percent or 15 percent? In 2003, the latest year with
reliable data, about $42 billion in U.S.-source dividends
were paid to nonresident corporations, but only about
$1.9 billion (or 4.5 percent) was withheld.6 This suggests
that the only dividends actually subject to withholding
are direct dividends, that is, dividends paid to affiliated
corporations within multinational enterprises, which are
typically subject to the reduced treaty tax rate of 5
percent. What happened to all the portfolio dividends?
2. Equity swaps. Beginning in the 1980s, derivative
financial instruments have been developed that poten-
tially undermine the integrity of the income tax by, for
example, converting equity into debt.7 For present pur-
poses, the relevant derivative is the total return equity
swap (TRES).
In a TRES transaction, a foreign investor (who may or
may not hold stock in a U.S. corporation) enters into an
agreement with a U.S. financial institution. Under the
TRES agreement, the investor pays an amount equal to
the value of some amount of stock of a U.S. corporation
(the underlying stock) to the financial institution. In
return, the investor receives (a) the right to a dividend
equivalent (DE) whenever the underlying stock pays an
actual dividend, and (b) the right to any appreciation in
the stock when the TRES expires, and undertakes to pay
the financial institution for any decline in the stock’s
value when the TRES expires. Thus, for the period of the
TRES, the holder of the TRES is in the same economic
position as if it held the underlying stock, although it is
not a stock owner for corporate governance purposes (for
example, voting).
The financial institution then uses the funds received
from the investor to purchase the underlying stock.
During the period of the TRES, the financial institution
pays a DE whenever the underlying stock pays a divi-
dend. On expiration of the TRES, the financial institution
sells the underlying stock, and the parties settle the TRES
transaction by making a payment equal to the apprecia-
tion or depreciation of the stock.
What are the tax consequences of that transaction? For
the financial institution, the actual dividends received on
the underlying stock represent income, but that is offset
by a deduction for the DE payment to the investor. The
capital gain or loss on the underlying stock at the end of
the TRES is likewise offset by the payment to settle the
TRES. Thus, the U.S. financial institution is perfectly
hedged and indifferent to the tax treatment of the DE (it
pays tax on the fees received for undertaking the TRES).
For the foreign investor, the capital gain or loss at the
end of the TRES is foreign-source income and thus not
subject to U.S. taxation.8 Before 1991, there was uncer-
tainty about the tax treatment of the DE. It could be
argued that the DE was equivalent to a dividend and
therefore subject to U.S. withholding tax. However, in
January 1991 Treasury issued a regulation stating that
‘‘the source of notional principal contract income’’ (which
includes income from derivatives such as the TRES)
‘‘shall be determined by reference to the residence of the
taxpayer.’’9 Thus, because the recipient of the TRES is a
foreign resident, the DE is foreign-source income and not
subject to U.S. tax.
Why did Treasury adopt that rule? At the time, there
was widespread concern that imposing withholding
taxes on derivatives would kill a new and flourishing
market in securities, which arguably benefited both Wall
Street and U.S. issuers by harnessing billions of dollars of
funds. There was extensive lobbying by the Securities
Industry Association and expressions of concern that the
uncertainty regarding the source of income on deriva-
tives was harming the market.10
It was immediately understood that the effect of the
new rule would be to exempt DEs from the withholding
tax even if economically they are indistinguishable from
dividends. Commentators expressed concern that the
source rule for derivatives would result in widespread
avoidance of the withholding tax on dividends because a
TRES gives the foreign holder the same economic returns
as an investment in the underlying stock, but enables it to
avoid the withholding tax because of the source rule for
DEs.11
royalties are not, this reflects the reality that (a) royalties are tax
free by treaty because the United States gains more from
reducing foreign taxes on royalties than it loses by reducing its
own, and (b) interest is tax free because it can easily be earned
anywhere in the world and an attempt to impose withholding
taxes on it would lead investors to go elsewhere and/or increase
costs to U.S. borrowers. Dividends, on the other hand, arguably
represent an investment in unique U.S. companies earning
particular forms of rent, so the investment cannot easily be
replicated elsewhere. For a proposal to impose withholding
taxes on interest and royalties in coordination with other OECD
members, see Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘‘A Coordinated Withholding
Tax on Deductible Payments,’’ Tax Notes, June 2, 2008, p. 993,
Doc 2008-11497, or 2008 TNT 107-35.
6‘‘Tax Compliance: Qualified Intermediary Program Pro-
vides Some Assurance That Taxes on Foreign Investors Are
Withheld and Reported, but Can Be Improved,’’ Government
Accountability Office, Report No. GAO-08-99 (Dec. 2007), Doc
2008-1666, 2008 TNT 18-47, Table 3.
7Alvin C. Warren Jr., ‘‘Financial Contract Innovation and
Income Tax Policy,’’ 107 Harv. L. Rev. 460 (1993); for an argument
that the threat posed by derivatives to the income tax has been
exaggerated, see David M. Hasen, ‘‘A Realization-Based Ap-
proach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments,’’ 57 Tax L. Rev.
397 (2004).
8Section 865(a)(2).
9Reg. section 1.863-7(b), adopted by T.D. 8330 (Jan. 11, 1991).
For interest rate swaps, a similar rule was already adopted in
1987, Notice 87-4, 1987-1 C.B. 416.
10See, generally, H. David Rosenbloom, et al., ‘‘General Re-
port, Tax Aspects of Derivative Financial Instruments,’’ 80b
Cahiers de droit fiscal international (1995); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
and Linda Z. Swartz, ‘‘U.S. International Tax Treatment of
Financial Derivatives,’’ Tax Notes, Mar. 31, 1997, p. 1703, Doc
97-5985, or 97 TNT 61-49.
11See, e.g., Oren Penn, ‘‘Withholding Tax in Cross-Border
Equity Swaps: The Dividend Problem,’’ 93 TNI 196-14; Gregory
May, ‘‘Flying on Instruments: Synthetic Investments and the
Avoidance of Withholding Tax,’’ Tax Notes, Dec. 9, 1996, p. 1225,
Doc 96-29690, or 96 TNT 239-32; Avi-Yonah and Swartz, supra
note 10; Yaron Reich, ‘‘Taxing Foreign Investors’ Portfolio In-
vestments: Developments and Discontinuities,’’ Tax Notes, June
COMMENTARY / SHELF PROJECT
(Footnote continued on next page.)





ll rights reserved. T
ax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
Treasury and the IRS were aware of those concerns. In
January of 1992, in the context of issuing the new rule for
securities lending (discussed below), Treasury and the
IRS expressed concern that the derivative source rule
could lead to avoidance of the dividend withholding tax
by using a TRES, and suggested that a single stock TRES
may be abusive.12 However, no action was taken. In 1998,
in the context of issuing new regulations governing the
treatment of derivatives under section 446, Treasury and
the IRS repeated their concern that a TRES could be used
to avoid dividend withholding.13 In response, the New
York State Bar Association (NYSBA) Tax Section issued a
report urging Treasury not to treat DEs as equivalent to
actual dividends for withholding tax purposes.14 Again,
Treasury and the IRS took no action.
The market understood the inaction by Treasury and
the IRS as a sign that using a TRES (even on a single
stock, and even when the investor held the actual stock
before and after entering into a TRES over the ex-
dividend date) is an ‘‘approved loophole.’’ As a result, by
2008, only the hopelessly unsophisticated foreign portfo-
lio investor would invest directly in the stock of U.S.
corporations and incur the withholding tax on actual
dividends.15 Instead, everyone invests using TRESs and
receives tax-free DEs. Thus, it is unsurprising that the
Government Accountability Office report numbers sug-
gest that no withholding tax is collected from foreign
corporate investors in U.S. portfolio stock. The numbers
indicate that the entire amount collected as withholding
tax on dividends stems from direct (over 10 percent)
holders, who care about voting the stock and therefore
will not enter into a TRES.16
3. Securities loans. In 1992, a year after issuing the new
rule for sourcing DEs, Treasury and the IRS issued
proposed regulations governing securities lending trans-
actions.17 Those regulations take a different approach to
taxing dividend substitutes (DS) made under a securities
lending transaction. The regulations were finalized in
1997.18
In a typical cross-border securities loan, a foreign
holder of U.S. stock enters into an agreement with a U.S.
borrower. Under the agreement, the U.S. borrower bor-
rows the stock for a certain period of time, and returns it
thereafter. The U.S. borrower is treated as the holder of
the stock for the period of the loan, and therefore is
entitled to receive any dividends on it during that period.
Because the foreign lender forgoes the right to receive
dividends for the term of the loan, the U.S. borrower
agrees to make a DS payment any time the underlying
stock pays a dividend. Thus, the U.S. borrower receives
the dividend, and immediately turns around and makes
a DS payment to the foreign lender. Because the DS
payment is deductible, the U.S. borrower has no net
income.
What are the tax consequences for the foreign bor-
rower? Under the regulations, a ‘‘substitute dividend
payment shall be sourced in the same manner as the
distributions with respect to the transferred security.’’19
Thus, a DS is treated as a dividend for all U.S. tax
purposes (including for tax treaty purposes), and there-
fore it is subject to U.S. withholding tax when made from
a U.S. borrower to a foreign lender.
The contrast between the DS rule (for securities loans)
from 1992 and the DE rule (for TRESs) from 1991 is
impressive because economically both transactions are
identical: In both, as well as in a direct investment in the
underlying stock, the foreign investor receives the full
amount of the dividend.20 Why, then, is the DS treated as
a dividend for withholding tax purposes, while the DE is
not?
In its 1998 report on the issue, the NYSBA Tax Section
argued that the DS rule should not be applied to DEs
because in a TRES the foreign holder may never have
held the underlying stock, while in a DS and a direct
investment the foreign holder held the stock.21 That may
or may not be true (in many TRES transactions the
foreign investor holds the stock before and after the
TRES, which is entered into to cover the ex-dividend
date). But even if true, it is unclear why it is relevant.
Economically, the foreign investor in a TRES is in exactly
15, 1998, p. 1465, Doc 98-19132, or 98 TNT 114-71; David P.
Hariton, ‘‘Equity Derivatives, Inbound Capital and Outbound
Withholding Tax,’’ 60 Tax Lawyer 313 (2007).
12Preamble to prop. reg. section 1.861-3(a)(6), 57 Fed. Reg. 860
(Jan. 9, 1992).
13Preamble to reg. section 1.446-3, 1998-1 C.B. 1322 (June 29,
1998).
14NYSBA, ‘‘Report on the Imposition of U.S. Withholding
Tax on Substitute and Derivative Dividend Payments Received
by Foreign Persons,’’ Tax Notes, June 29, 1998, p. 1749, Doc
98-17347, 98 TNT 107-21 (the NYSBA report). The NYSBA report
made two arguments: first, that an investor in a TRES is not the
same as an investor in the underlying stock or as an investor in
a securities lending transaction because it may never hold the
underlying stock; and second, that if Treasury attacked single
stock TRES, the same result can be achieved using baskets.
Those arguments are addressed below.
15An important question is whether these investors are truly
foreign or whether they are U.S. persons investing through tax
havens and avoiding their tax liability on dividends. Joe Gut-
tentag and I have estimated that the United States loses $50
billion each year because of tax haven abuses by U.S. resident
taxpayers. See Joseph Guttentag and Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Clos-
ing the International Tax Gap,’’ in Max B. Sawicky (ed.), Bridging
the Tax Gap: Addressing the Crisis in Federal Tax Administration, 99
(2005).
16Note, however, that it may be possible for a foreign parent
to create two classes of stock in its subsidiary, one carrying the
vote and the other the dividend, and engage in a TRES
regarding the dividend paying stock while retaining the voting
stock.
1757 Fed. Reg. 860 (Jan. 9, 1992).
18T.D. 8735 (Oct. 6, 1997), Doc 97-27930, 97 TNT 194-8.
19Reg. section 1.861-3(a)(6).
20Minus any fee levied on the DS or DE, which represents a
payment to the U.S. financial institution for ‘‘enhancing the
dividend yield,’’ that is, enabling the investor to avoid the
withholding tax.
21NYSBA report, supra note 14. NYSBA also argues that any
change to the DE rule involving single stocks can be avoided by
using baskets. Because of this issue, I would recommend a rule
relying on the well-established ‘‘substantially similar or related
property’’ standard of section 246(c). See recommendations
below.
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the same position as a foreign investor in the underlying
stock or as a foreign lender in a securities loan: All three
are entitled to the dividend, and all three have the upside
and downside risk of holding the stock.22
I believe that Treasury and the IRS had second
thoughts about the 1991 DE rule by the time they issued
the DS rule a year later, as indicated by the concerns
expressed in the preamble to the DS rule. That explains
why they took a different approach in the DS rule.
However, no action was taken to curb abusive exploita-
tion of the DE rule in the period from 1992 to the present.
4. Combining equity swaps with securities loans. Treas-
ury and the IRS finalized the DS rule in October 1997.
Taxpayers immediately expressed concerns that the DS
rule could result in a ‘‘cascading’’ withholding tax on
multiple securities lending transactions.
The cascading issue arises because the DS rule applies
to any securities loan involving stock of a U.S. corpora-
tion, including a securities loan between foreign persons.
Suppose that foreign person 1 lends stock in a U.S.
corporation to foreign person 2. Under the DS rule, if the
U.S. issuer pays a dividend to foreign person 2 (the
holder for the period of the loan), and if foreign person 2
then makes a DS payment to foreign person 1, both
payments (the actual dividend and the DS) would be
subject to withholding, resulting in a cascading tax of
more than 30 percent.
How likely is this scenario? Generally unlikely be-
cause the obvious solution is to make the securities loan
to a U.S. person, not to another foreign person, thereby
avoiding the cascading by avoiding the withholding tax
on the actual dividend. However, taxpayers argued that
in some cases, regulatory limits prevented foreign
lenders from engaging in securities loans with borrowers
outside their own country.23
Because of those concerns, Treasury and the IRS issued
Notice 97-66 in November 1997 (that is, a month after the
DS rule became effective). Under Notice 97-66, the U.S.
withholding tax on a DS foreign to foreign payment ‘‘will
be the amount of the underlying dividend multiplied by
a rate equal to the excess of the rate of U.S. withholding
tax that would be applicable to U.S.-source dividends
paid by a U.S. person directly to the recipient of the
substitute payment over the rate of U.S. withholding tax
that would be applicable to U.S. source dividends paid
by a U.S. person directly to the payer of the substitute
payment.’’24
What this means is that if foreign persons 1 and 2 are
in the same country or in two countries subject to the
same dividend withholding tax rate (for example, 30
percent and 30 percent or 15 percent and 15 percent), and
if a U.S. withholding tax was imposed on an actual dividend to
foreign person 2, then a DS payment from foreign person 2
to foreign person 1 would not be subject to U.S. with-
holding tax because a direct payment from the U.S. to
either foreign person would be subject to the same
withholding tax rate.25
The clear intent of the notice, as stated in both the text
and in the examples, is to condition this rule on an actual
U.S. withholding tax being paid on an actual dividend or
a DS somewhere in the chain. If no U.S. withholding tax
is ever paid, no cascading issue arises.
However, because the notice (issued in haste a month
after the DS rule was finalized) did not explicitly include
that condition, taxpayers soon found a way to avoid the
DS rule by combining it with the DE rule.26 In such
transactions, instead of foreign person 2 holding the
actual stock of the U.S. corporation (and thereby subject-
ing itself to withholding tax), foreign person 2 would
enter into a TRES regarding the stock. Foreign person 2
would then receive the DE free of withholding tax under
the DE rule, and would make the DS payment to foreign
person 1 free of withholding tax under Notice 97-66.
I believe this treatment of the transaction is wrong
under the terms of Notice 97-66. Because the rationale for
the notice hinges on an actual withholding tax being due
somewhere in the chain, it is inappropriate to interpret it
as exempting the DS payment from withholding tax
when there is no withholding tax due anywhere. Even if
the taxpayer does not know whether a withholding tax is
due (for example, because foreign person 2 sells the
borrowed stock into the market and does not know who
the buyer is), I would argue that the notice does not
apply because foreign person 2 has the burden of proof to
show that a withholding tax applies somewhere before it
can exempt its DS payment to foreign person 1 from
withholding under the notice.
B. Reasons for Change
In my opinion, there is no good policy reason to treat
actual dividends, DEs, and DSs differently for withhold-
ing tax purposes. Treating them differently causes distor-
tions and increases transaction costs that are wasted on
devising transactions like the ones set out above.
C. Proposals
I would recommend that Congress, Treasury, and the
IRS take the following actions to prevent the widespread
avoidance of the dividend withholding tax:
The DE rule (reg. section 1.863-7(b)) should be revised.
For DEs on single stock TRESs, the rule should be the
same as the DS rule (reg. section 1.861-3(a)(6)), that is, the
DE should be treated as an actual dividend for all U.S. tax
purposes. Moreover, DEs on a basket of stock should
22In some TRES and securities loan transactions, the foreign
holder gets less than the full amount of the dividend; the
difference is simply a fee paid to the U.S. financial institution
that arranges the transaction. For TRES transactions, this fee
may also incorporate a splitting of the risk that the IRS would
seek to impose with a withholding tax on the TRES.
23I have seen no evidence that this is a serious concern.
24Notice 97-66, 1997-2 C.B. 328, Doc 97-30949, 97 TNT 219-8.
25Ironically, this means that a DS payment from one tax
haven person to another is subject to better treatment than a
payment from a non-tax-haven person to a tax haven person
(because the 15 percent to 30 percent payment would be subject
to tax at 15 percent, while the 30 percent to 30 percent payment
is exempt).
26Treasury and the IRS may have realized this by the time
they expressed concern on abusing the DE rule in the preamble
to the section 446 regulations (June 1998).
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likewise be treated as equivalent to a dividend if the
basket represents ‘‘substantially similar or related prop-
erty’’ (as defined under section 246(c) and the regulations
thereunder) to a single stock.
Notice 97-66 should be amended to explicitly condi-
tion its application on the taxpayer showing that a U.S.
withholding tax was levied on a dividend or a DS
payment in the same chain of transactions to which the
notice is being applied.
D. Conclusion
Congress has determined that foreign taxpayers who
invest in U.S. portfolio equities should be subject to a 30
percent or 15 percent withholding tax. Many commenta-
tors have argued that this result is inappropriate when
interest and royalties are usually not subject to withhold-
ing tax. However, the distinction between royalties, in-
terest, and dividends can be defended.27 Moreover, even
if a ‘‘dividend portfolio exemption’’ is appropriate as a
policy matter, as long as Congress does not enact one,
and as long as the Senate does not ratify treaties with a
zero rate for portfolio dividends, it is up to Treasury and
the IRS to defend the U.S. revenue base by preventing
taxpayers from abusing the DE and DS rules in the ways
explained above. If they do not, Congress should enact
legislation along the lines specified above.
27See note 5 supra.
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